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(The 2nd Chapter of The Atomic Islamic Iran)
● Mehdi Falahati
● March 2006
1. Dawn, noon, and evening, are three main occasions of the Moslems daily obligatory praying. Although there are some differences in the Shiites and the Sunnies daily prayers performances, the prayer text of the both are the same. Namaz-e Jum’eh ( in Arabic: Salaat-ul-Jumma) or Friday Prayer is replaced of the noon Prayer. The Friday Prayer among the Sunnies and in most Arab countries is an obligatory prayer for every adult male Muslim. In Iran, the Friday prayers were instituted immediately after the Islamic Revolution in February 1979 and immediatly an official institution was formed to organize, coordinate and manage all Friday Prayers throughout the country, regarding appointment of the Imams and the issues that must be discussed in specially one of the two sermons at the occasion. In the Shiite Iran the Friday Prayer is not considered as obligatory as the daily Prayers are considered, but the most believers and supporters of the government have always been the Friday Prayer attendants. Both sermons are delivered by the Imams and one of them is on urgent matters that face the Moslem land or lands. There is sometimes an invited contributor who is always an official man, to give speech, though the main issue is always discussed by the Imam. The Friday Prayers in Iran, are the Leader’s propagation arm. The Centre for Friday Prayers Imams is included some of the most hard-liner mullahs and is officially benefited from the annual budget of the government. What is important to know about the Friday Prayers is that all main political, social, and cultural issues are discussed in that occasion. The Friday Prayers are place for official announcements, testing the society by declaring a policy before implementing it, stating the government’s position or the Leader’s position whenever the government or the Leader do not want to state officially that position, and to provoke and mobilize the mass militia. A conclusion of all these functions is that the topic in the Friday Prayer speech is the ruling policy topic. 2. There was only one ruling cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Hosseini Beheshti, who insisted that the Islamic Iran should be considered as a nuclear power. (Jalal Barzegar, an interview with Vice Chairman of the AEOI, Mohammad Saidi, “Iran” daily, March 2, 2005). Ayatollah Beheshti was the first Iran’s chief justice and was killed when a huge bomb blast destroyed the Islamic Republic Party’s headquarters in Tehran on July 28, 1981. The blast occurred by opponent groups apparently Mojahedin-khalq-e Iran. 3. First Iranian oil minister, Ali Akbar Moinfar, Iran-Mehr monthly review, Tehran, September 2005. 4. E. Khalilpour, Vice President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI), Iran’s official letter to IAEA, October 9, 2003. 5. A round table on the Iran’s nuclear challenge, Iran-Mehr monthly review, Tehran, September 2005. 6. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1992, Volume 48, Number 2, p. 11. 7. Discovery of Uranium, BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 21 December 1981. 8. Nuclear News, March 1985; Nucleonics Week, May 7, 1987; Nucleonics Week, September 10, 1987. 9. David Albright, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July/August 1995, p. 23. 10.11. A 30 Mega-electronvolt (MeV) cyclotron accelerator supplied by Belgium’s Ion Beam Applications, and a one milliamp (mA) Chinese supplied and installed calutron are located there. 12. Arnold Beichman, A Modern Genghis with Risky Dreams, The Washington Times, August 13, 1992, p. G3. 13. Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, Iran’s nuclear Facilities: a Profile, Centre for Non-proliferation Studies, California, 1998. 14. John R. Bolton, The US Under Secretary for Arms Control and International Security, Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee, Washington, DC, March 30, 2004. 15.16. David Albright, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1992, Volume 48, Number 2, p. 11. 17. ABC South Asia Correspondent Geoff Thompson, February 5, 2004. 18. Abdul Qadeer Khan’s confession on Pakistan’s national television, February, 4, 2004. 19. AFP news agency, February, 6, 2004. 20. 21. The Guardian, February, 5, 2004. 22. 23. The DAWN, February 7, 2004. 24. Ben Laden met nuke scientists, Central Standard Time, February 8, 2004. 25. Newsweek, February 14, 2004. 26. AllExperts, experts.about.com/e/a/ab/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan. 27. 28. globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/Pakistan/khan. 29. Leonard Weiss, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, May/June 2004, pp. 52-59, Vol. 60, no. 03. 30. Robert Windrem, Pakistan: The Crazy Soup, MSNBC, February 8, 2004; Steve Weissman and Herbert Krosny, Pakistan, in The Islamic Bomb, New York Times Books, 1981, pp. 161-226. 31. The Khan Network, Paper by David E. Sanger, White House correspondent for the New York Times, presented at the Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, Stanford University, June 4-5, 2004. 32. Sharon A. Squasoni, Weapons of Mass Destruction: Trade Between North Korea and Pakistan, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, May 7, 2003. 33. Stanford Institute for International Studies, Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, June 4-5, 2005. 34. Carnegie Endowment for International peace, Proliferation brief, Volume 8, Number 8. 35. AFP news agency, February 7, 2004. 36. The New York Times, December 26, 2004. 37. AFP news agency, November 20, 2005. 38. Reuters, November 18, 2005. 39. Daily Times, December 28, 2004. 40. The New York Times, December 26, 2004. 41. www.expatica.com/source/site_article. 42. Benazir Bhutto, Pakistani Prime Minister (1988-1990, and 1993-1996), in March 2005, While talking to a group of Pakistani journalist in Washington, said that, in 1993, when she was going to North Korea as Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Pakistani scientists working on the countries nuclear and missile programs (mainly at Khan laboratories), asked her to bring blueprints of North Korean longer range missiles those which Pakistan already had. “These were not nuclear missiles but had the capability to carry nuclear weapons”, she said. “They [North Koreans] gave us missile technology, whatever they had developed in return for cash”. It was “quite possible”, The former Pakistani Prime Minister added that “when we were facing a financial crunch because of our nuclear tests”, the exchange of nuclear technology for missiles “might have happened”. (Sources: United Press International, March 8, 2005; A.Q. Khan fall guy for Musharraf: Benazir, rediff.com). 43. Stanford Institute for International Studies, Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, June 4-5, 2005. 44. AllExperts, experts.about.com/e/a/ab/Abdul_Qadeer_Khan. 45. Stanford Institute for International Studies, Conference on South Asia and the Nuclear Future, June 4-5, 2005. 46. Jihad Watch, January 3, 2004. 47. Yossi Melman, “ Iran’s Lethal Secret: How the Rafsanjani Regime is closing in an Atomic Weaponry,” The Washington Post, October 18, 1992, p. C5. 48. J.P. Smith, “Iraq’s Nuclear Arms Option,” The Washington Post, August 8, 1978, p. 14. 49. Rediff.com, An Exclusive Interview with Benazir Bhutto, March 05, 2004. 50. Segal, “Atomic Ayatollahs: Just What the Middle East Needs-An Iranian Bomb,” p. D1. 51. Michael Laufer, A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Brief, Volume 8, Number 8. 52. Pakistan rejects US press report Khan offered Iran nuclear material in 1987. Daily Times, February 28, 2005. 53. Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, 2 June 1991, pp. 17-18; David Albright and Mark Hibbs, The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 1992, p. 9-11. 54. AFP News Agency, November 20. 55. Daily Times, February 28, 2005. 56. Michael Laufer, A.Q. Khan Nuclear Chronology, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Proliferation Brief, Volume 8, Number 8. 57. globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/iran/khan-iran. 58. Middle East Executive Reports, Volume 6, Number 3, March 1983, p.17. 59. David Albright and Corey Hinderstein, The Centrifuge Connection, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March/April 2004, pp. 61-66, Vol. 60, no. 02. 60. Richard Kessler, "Argentine's Hope for Expanded Iran Contracts from Teheran Talks," Nucleonics Week, December 11, 1986, pp. 1-2. 61. Richard Kessler, Nucleonics Week, May 14, 1987, pp. 6-7; Nuclear News, July 1987, pp. 4-5; Nuclear Engineering International, July 1987, pp. 4-5; Richard Kessler and Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, November 12, 1987, pp. 6-7. 62. David Albright, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, January 1995. 63. INVAP Fears Bankruptcy After Shipment is Halted, Nuclear Engineering International, June 1992, p. 12. 64. Warren H. Donnelly and Zachary S. Davis, Iran's Nuclear Activities and the Congressional Response, CRS Issue Brief, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, May 20, 1992. 65. “Argentine Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEA) signed a contract with Islamic republic of Iran to supply 115.8kg of 20 percent enriched uranium in 1988 but the nuclear fuel was not delivered until 1993.” Iranian nuclear imports, Andrew Koch and Jeanette Wolf, Centre for Non-proliferation Studies. Also see: Claude van England, "Iran Defends Its Pursuit of Nuclear Technology," The Christian Science Monitor, February 18, 1993. 66. Worldwide Report, July 13, 1987, p. 40. 67. An Iranian Nuclear Chronology, 1987-1982, Middle East Defense News, June 8, 1992; Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East, New York, NY: Routledge Press, 1988, p. 83; Also: Mark Hibbs, Nucleonics Week, May 2, 1991, pp. 17-18. 68. Financial Mail, August 15, 1997; Inigo Gilmore, Times (London), August 18, 1997. 69. Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria, and Libya, A Simon Wiesenthal Center Special Report from Middle East Defence News, August 1992; p. 42. 70. The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 1992, Volume 48, Number 2, p. 10. 71. Michael Eisenstadt, Déjà vu All Over Again? Iran's Military Build-Up: An Assessment, National Defence University, 22 February 1994. 72. Los Angeles Times, August 29, 1991; September 13, 1991; and Los Angeles Times (Orange County Edition), March 31, 1992. 73. The Jerusalem Post, April 23, 1992. Also see: www.balkanpeace.org. 74. AFP News Agency, March 9, 1993. Also see: The Jerusalem Post, April 23, 1992. 75. Roger Fallgot and Jan Mather, "Iran Has N-Bomb," The European, 30 April-3 May 1992, p. 1. 76. —"Iran Buys Bomb," 16 March 1992, in Lexis-Nexis; Kenneth R. Timmerman, Weapons of Mass Destruction: The Cases of Iran, Syria and Libya, Los Angeles: Simon Wiesenthal Center, 1992, p. 52; ITAR-TASS, 16 March 1992. 77. Tapped Line Said To Reveal Deal On Warheads, FBIS, 15 January 1993, pp. 61-62. Also: www.nti.org/e_search/profiles/iran/1825_1869. 78. Unenriched Uranium-238 Reportedly Sold in Groznyy, Proliferation Issues, 24 November 1992, p. 26. 79. Uranium Theft May Be Part of Decade Old Heist, Charles Digges, Environmental Foundation Bellona, www.bellona.no. 80. ANS TV, Baku, June 19, 1998; Zerkalo, Baku, July 4, 1998, pp. 5, 26. 81. Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI), from Segodnya (Moscow), September 23, 1999; and in Georgia: Seized Uranium May have been Iran-bound, FBIS, September 23, 1999. 82. Reuters, October 6,7, 1993. “Milliyet”, Istanbul, October 9, 1993. 83. The Independent, London, March 28, 1996; Nuclear Chronology, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 84. Indeed, regarding the matter, there has been an obvious difference between Rafsanjani’s Presidential terms and Khatami’s administration (1997-2005). While Rafsanjani leaned on the intelligence services and tried to obtain nuclear know-how and technologies through black markets, Khatami attempted to go through the legal ways. Moreover, the whole Iranian intelligence services (mainly SAVAMA and VAVAK) were paralyzed during the first term of Khatami’s presidency. Some top officials were questioned and some were dismissed from their posts. Although the officials trial was in connection with the murder of Iranian intellectuals, but the move caused so much damage to the Rafsanjani’s intelligence system that the intelligence services could not function in almost any mentioned aspects as they had previously done. After Khatami’s term, the previous intelligence system was rebuild and as many Iranian experts suggest the intelligence services under the Presidency of Ahmadi-Nejad is the most complicated and brutal than any of its precedents. At least two of the Ahmadi-Nejad’s main cabinet members (the Interior Minister and the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance) are the people who are strongly said that they have been involved in killing intellectuals, and torturing the opponents in prisons at the time of both Rafsanjani and Khatami’s Presidency. That means under Khatami’s Presidency the system was not, and could not be changed; it just functioned through some other ways. 85. AP News Agency, August 30, 1997; The Observer, London, August 31, 1997. 86. AFP News Agency, April 23, 1998. 87. Jewish Telegraph Agency, January 19, 1998. Nuclear Chronology, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). 88. Interfax, Moscow, November 14, 1997. 89. Middle East Newsline, October 11, 1999. 90. Al-Zaman, London, December 10, 1999, in Nuclear Chronology, Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI).
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